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Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?


Julian R. Franks


London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Colin Mayer


University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Luc Renneboog


Tilburg University - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Undated


Abstract:     
Who disciplines management of poorly performing firms? Four parties are considered: existing holders of large blocks of shares, investors acquiring new shareholdings, creditors and non-executive directors. This paper reports a comparative evaluation of the role of all four parties using a large sample of UK companies. Like the US, we find that there is a high level of executive board turnover in poorly performing companies but, contrary to US evidence, outside directors perform a weak disciplinary function and most outside owners of large share blocks exert little influence. Financial factors are important in the disciplining of management: high board turnover is closely linked to high levels of debt and to new equity finance in the form of distressed rights issues.

JEL Classification: G34

working papers series


Date posted: April 27, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Franks, Julian R., Mayer, Colin and Renneboog, Luc, Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies? (Undated). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=218653

Contact Information

Julian R. Franks (Contact Author)
London Business School ( email )
Institute of Finance and Accounting
Sussex Place - Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7262 5050 x3449 (Phone)
+44 20 7724 3317 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Colin Mayer
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288112 (Phone)
+44 1865 288805 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Luc Renneboog
Tilburg University - Department of Finance ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Warandelaan 2
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+13 31 466 8210 (Phone)
+13 31 466 2875 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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