Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2187765
 
 

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Power Markets Shaped by Antitrust


Malgorzata M. Sadowska


University of Bologna

Bert Willems


Tilburg University - Department of Economics - CentER & TILEC

March 2013

TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-007

Abstract:     
In November 2011 Sweden abolished the uniform national electricity price and introduced separate price zones. This was the result of an antitrust settlement between the Commission and the Swedish network operator, which was accused of discriminating between domestic and export electricity transmission services and segmenting the internal market. Based on this case, we show how the Commission uses competition law enforcement to foster market integration in the energy sector. We find that, even though the Commission’s action under competition rules was contrived and lacked economic depth, the commitment package provides an economically sound, longterm solution to network access and congestion management in Sweden. Such a quick and far-reaching change of Swedish congestion management could not have been achieved by Swedish policymakers or enforcement of the EU sector-specific regulation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: competition policy, Article 102 TFEU, commitment decisions

JEL Classification: K21, K23, K40, K42, L43, L44, L94

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Date posted: December 12, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Sadowska, Malgorzata M. and Willems, Bert, Power Markets Shaped by Antitrust (March 2013). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2187765 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2187765

Contact Information

Malgorzata M. Sadowska (Contact Author)
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40100
Italy
Bert Willems
Tilburg University - Department of Economics - CentER & TILEC ( email )
P.O. Box 90153 Room K308
Tilburg, 5000LE
Netherlands
+31134662588 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.bertwillems.com
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