Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2188141
 
 

References (54)



 
 

Footnotes (15)



 


 



Delays in Leniency Application: Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door?


Dennis L. Gärtner


University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics

J. Zhou


Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

November 1, 2012


Abstract:     
This paper studies cartels' strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that conspirators often apply for leniency long after a cartel collapses. We estimate hazard and probit models to study the determinants of leniency-application delays. Statistical tests find that delays are symmetrically affected by antitrust policies and macroeconomic fluctuations. Our results shed light on the design of enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: corporate leniency program, cartel, leniency application delays

JEL Classification: D43, K21, K42, L13

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: December 12, 2012 ; Last revised: December 14, 2012

Suggested Citation

Gärtner, Dennis L. and Zhou, J., Delays in Leniency Application: Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door? (November 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2188141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2188141

Contact Information

Dennis L. Gärtner
University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics ( email )
Postfach 2220
D-53012 Bonn
Germany
J. Zhou (Contact Author)
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) - Department of Economics ( email )
Box 7013 (Johan Brauners väg 3)
S-901 83 Umea, 750 07
Sweden
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 442
Downloads: 278
Download Rank: 61,992
References:  54
Footnotes:  15

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.672 seconds