For a Rigorous 'Effects Based' Analysis of Vertical Restraints Adopted by Dominant Firms: An Analysis of the EU and Brazilian Competition Laws: Comment
Seth B. Sacher
Federal Trade Commission
December 12, 2012
In a recent working paper, Damien Geradin & Caio Marioda Silva Pereira Neto argue that the Brazilian competition system would greatly benefit from the adoption of guidelines like the European Commission Guidance Paper, which offers a legal and economic methodology to implement an “effects-based approach” to vertical restraints adopted by a dominant firm. This paper notes that while their proposed effects based analysis is far superior to per se treatment of vertical restraints, this framework can be further improved by careful attention to the challenges raised by the so-called “Chicago School” regarding the impact of vertical restraints. Further, whether it would be advisable for Brazil to write formal guidances regarding its policy toward vertical restraints should be evaluated in light of both the nature of Brazilian competition laws and the flexibility of the Brazilian economy.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23
Keywords: competition law, antitrust, Brazil, vertical restraints, abuse of dominance, unilateral conduct, tying, rebates, exclusive dealing, enforcement
JEL Classification: K21, K40, L10, L42working papers series
Date posted: December 14, 2012
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