On Natalie Stoljar's Wishful Thinking and One Step Beyond: What Should Conceptual Legal Analysis Become?
Imer B. Flores
Georgetown University Law Center; Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM)
December 12, 2012
Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho, No. 6, 2012
Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 12-191
Praising wishful thinking is a serious risk that I am willing to run not only in this article commenting of Natalie Stoljar’s work but also elsewhere in my own scholarship. Although I will analyze her claims and will agree mostly with them, I will criticize her for stopping one step short adopting the desirability or weaker claim, when in it is not merely possible but necessary to go one step beyond arguing for the necessity or stronger claim. Accordingly, I intend to present further grounds for endorsing “conceptual (legal) analysis pluralism” by distinguishing the three different inquiry or projects that are and must be integrated and stating the normative priority of one of them, i.e. the prescriptive, interpretive, and moral.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 31
Keywords: Conceptual Analysis, Integrative Jurisprudence, Legal Methodology, Legal PluralismAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 12, 2012
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