Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191124
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

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Online Advertising and Privacy


Alexandre De Corniere


University of Oxford

Romain De Nijs


Paris School of Economics (PSE)

May 23, 2014


Abstract:     
An online platform auctions an advertising slot. Several advertisers compete in the auction, and consumers differ in their preferences. Prior to the auction, the platform decides whether to allow advertisers to access information about consumers (disclosure) or not (privacy). Disclosure improves the match between advertisers and consumers but increases product prices, even without price-discrimination. We provide conditions under which disclosure or privacy is privately and/or socially optimal. When advertisers compete on the downstream market, disclosure can lead to an increase or a decrease in product prices depending on the nature of the information.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: online advertising, privacy, information disclosure, auctions

JEL Classification: D4

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Date posted: December 19, 2012 ; Last revised: May 23, 2014

Suggested Citation

de Corniere, Alexandre and Nijs, Romain de, Online Advertising and Privacy (May 23, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191124 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2191124

Contact Information

Alexandre De Corniere (Contact Author)
University of Oxford ( email )
Department of Economics
Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3UQ
United Kingdom
Romain De Nijs
Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )
48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France
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Citations:  1
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