Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191298
 
 

References (54)



 
 

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Contracting Institutions


Claudia R. Williamson


Mississippi State University

December 18, 2012


Abstract:     
Property rights institutions, including contract enforcement, are recognized as a fundamental determinant to economic performance. However, understanding how to secure property remains elusive. This paper attempts to provide a theoretical framework and empirical analysis to unpack the black box of property rights. The framework entails distinguishing between private and public protection and subsequent enforcement mechanisms. Previous findings suggest that informal, cultural rules underlie constraints on government predation. Following this logic, this study asks how contract enforcement is achieved – through formal or informal mechanisms? After controlling for reverse causality, the empirical results suggest that informal cultural mechanisms protect against private predation and support contracting institutions while the formal institutions are insignificant. These results are robust to a variety of model specifications, multiple instrumental variables and a range of control variables.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: Property Rights, Contract Enforcement, Informal Institutions, Formal Institutions, Culture

JEL Classification: F55, O17

working papers series


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Date posted: December 19, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Williamson, Claudia R., Contracting Institutions (December 18, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191298 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2191298

Contact Information

Claudia R. Williamson (Contact Author)
Mississippi State University ( email )
Box 9580
312F McCool Hall
Mississippi State, MS 39762
United States
7242558627 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.claudiawilliamson.com
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References:  54
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