The Effects of Credit Competition on Banks’ Loan Loss Provision Timeliness
New York University (NYU) - Department of Accounting, Taxation & Business Law
Stephen G. Ryan
New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business
George Washington University - Department of Accountancy
May 7, 2014
Prior research has documented specific benefits, but not costs, of timelier loan loss provisioning for reporting banks. We examine one such cost in this paper. We argue that in a local loan origination market, incumbent banks’ reported loan loss provisions shape potential entrants’ perception of incumbents’ loan underwriting quality and thus the desirability of market entry. By loan underwriting quality, we mean banks’ ability to evaluate credit risk to determine which loans to grant as well as the interest rates and other contractual terms of granted loans. Incumbents with better loan underwriting quality leave fewer profitable lending opportunities for potential entrants. We use variation in interstate branching deregulation across contiguous counties of adjacent states from 1994 to 2005 as a natural experiment to investigate how increased threat of entry affects incumbent banks’ loan loss provision timeliness. We predict and find that incumbents more subject to entry reduce the timeliness of their bad news (but not good news) loan loss provisions to increase their perceived loan underwriting quality. Further, we predict and find variation in this behavior across loan origination markets attributable to incumbents’ loan portfolio composition and subsequent entry in these markets.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
Keywords: banks, deregulation, interstate branching, credit competition, loan loss provision, timeliness, natural experiment
JEL Classification: G21, L10, L89, M41working papers series
Date posted: December 22, 2012 ; Last revised: May 8, 2014
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