Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2193195
 
 

References (32)



 
 

Footnotes (39)



 


 



Successive Oligopolies with Differentiated Firms and Endogeneous Entry


Markus Reisinger


WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Monika Schnitzer


University of Munich - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

December 2012

The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 60, Issue 4, pp. 537-577, 2012

Abstract:     
We develop a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. We show that downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two‐tier structure while upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We analyze how two‐part tariffs and resale price maintenance shape the endogenous market structure and study their welfare effects. In contrast to previous literature, we find that welfare under linear prices can be larger than under twopart tariffs although the latter avoids double marginalization. This is because linear prices induce more downstream market entry.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: December 23, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Reisinger, Markus and Schnitzer, Monika, Successive Oligopolies with Differentiated Firms and Endogeneous Entry (December 2012). The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 60, Issue 4, pp. 537-577, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2193195 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12005

Contact Information

Markus Reisinger (Contact Author)
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )
Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany
00 49 261 6509 290 (Phone)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Monika Schnitzer
University of Munich - Department of Economics ( email )
Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany
+49 89 2180 2217 (Phone)
+49 89 2180 2767 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 152
Downloads: 1
References:  32
Footnotes:  39

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.296 seconds