Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms
David S. Evans
University of Chicago Law School; University College London; Global Economics Group
April 12, 2013
University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 627
Many online businesses, including most of the largest platforms, seek and provide attention. These online attention rivals provide products and features to obtain the attention of consumers and sell some of that attention, through other products and services, to merchants, developers and others who value it. The multi-sided business of seeking and providing attention is fluid with rivalries crossing boundaries defined by the features of the products and services. It is also dynamic. Rivals introduce new products and services, some involving drastic innovation, frequently. Online attention rivals impose competitive constraints on each other. Product differentiation tempers the significance of these constraints in particular situations. But the relevant differentiation mainly involves aspects of the attention that is procured and sold rather than, necessarily, particular features of the products and services used for acquiring and delivering that attention. Antitrust analysis should consider these competitive constraints in evaluating market definition, market power, and the potential for anticompetitive effects. Most importantly, antitrust analysis should focus on competition for seeking and providing attention rather than the particular products and services used for securing and delivering this attention. The existence of competition among attention rivals does not imply that antitrust should reduce the vigor with which it examines mergers and exclusionary practices among these platforms. It just needs to look for problems in the right places.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
Keywords: attention markets, attention economy, antitrust, market definition, internet industry, web industry, online advertising, multi-sided platforms, two-sided markets,s, market power, history of the internet, Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple
JEL Classification: D13, D21, D22, D41, D42, D47, D85, D92, J22, K21, L00, L11, L12, L13, L22, L26, L23, L40, L41, L60working papers series
Date posted: January 2, 2013 ; Last revised: April 20, 2013
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