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Welfare Standards in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement


Roger D. Blair


University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration - Department of Economics

D. Daniel Sokol


University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

March 11, 2013

Fordham Law Review, Volume 102: 81-145, 2013

Abstract:     
In Part I of this article, we discuss the importance of the development of economic analysis in US and European competition law to better explain how the choice of economic welfare standard has become the fundamental question of which goal to choose for competition law. This discussion sets up our substantive analysis of goals. In this article, we analyze two types of situations in which there would be a different outcome based on the goal implemented. In Part II, we discuss the first scenario. This scenario involves resale price maintenance (RPM). For RPM, we argue that even if there were a different welfare standard across jurisdictions as between Europe and the United States, in practice, it would have very little global impact. In the next part, Part III, we analyze the question of different global standards with regards to merger control. In this second scenario, we analyze a difference in welfare standard between merger regimes where the use of efficiencies might play out differently across Europe and the United States depending on the welfare standard used. Under this second scenario, the welfare standard matters globally as to business outcomes in a way in which it does not under the first scenario. If one major merger regime blocks the merger, it effectively blocks the merger globally. Part IV provides our concluding thoughts on the future and desirability of convergence around total welfare as the sole goal in the practice of competition economics globally.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: antitrust, competition law, goals, total welfare, consumer welfare, RPM, mergers, efficiencies, resale price maintenance, United States, Europe

JEL Classification: K21, l40, l42

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Date posted: January 4, 2013 ; Last revised: April 3, 2013

Suggested Citation

Blair, Roger D. and Sokol, D. Daniel, Welfare Standards in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement (March 11, 2013). Fordham Law Review, Volume 102: 81-145, 2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2195938 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2195938

Contact Information

Roger D. Blair
University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration - Department of Economics ( email )
342 Matherly Hall
Gainesville, FL 32611-7140
United States
352-392-0179 (Phone)
352-392-7860 (Fax)
D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )
Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol
George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )
200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States
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