Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2197013
 
 

Footnotes (92)



 


 



The Uneasy Case for Equal Access Law


Omri Ben-Shahar


University of Chicago Law School

January 1, 2013

University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 628

Abstract:     
Equal Access is one of the most appealing and least contentious regulatory techniques in law’s repertoire. It aspires to give people even opportunity to utilize certain primary goods, and it does so by assuring openness — that access to these goods is not distorted by wealth or by privilege. But equal access often fails, because access and its benefits are deployed disproportionately by elites, yet paid for directly or indirectly by weaker groups. This article demonstrates the unintended and regressive cross-subsidy created by policies of access to information, compensation, insurance, and accommodations. It then examines the debate over access to courts, and the effect of mandatory arbitration agreements that limit such access. It demonstrates that access to courts is a benefit to the elite and of little value to weak consumers. Finally, it considers the effect of arbitration clauses on class actions, and whether weak consumers are potentially the indirect beneficiaries of class action litigation. This argument has theoretical merit, but it, too, is limited in ways that are often unappreciated.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: January 6, 2013 ; Last revised: March 31, 2014

Suggested Citation

Ben-Shahar, Omri, The Uneasy Case for Equal Access Law (January 1, 2013). University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 628. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2197013 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2197013

Contact Information

Omri Ben-Shahar (Contact Author)
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,834
Downloads: 564
Download Rank: 25,505
Footnotes:  92

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.344 seconds