Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2199067
 
 

References (16)



 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (25)



 


 



Public Pension Accounting Rules and Economic Outcomes


James P. Naughton


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Reining Petacchi


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Joseph Weber


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

December 2014


Abstract:     
We find a negative association between a state’s fiscal condition and the use of discretion in applying Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) rules to understate pension funding gaps. We also find that the use of discretion is negatively associated with states’ decisions to increase taxes and cut spending. In addition, we find that the funding gap understatement is positively associated with higher future labor costs. Importantly, this association is primarily attributable to the GASB methodology, which systematically understates the funding gap. This suggests that the GASB approach is associated with policy choices that have the potential to exacerbate fiscal stress.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: January 11, 2013 ; Last revised: November 22, 2014

Suggested Citation

Naughton, James P. and Petacchi, Reining and Weber, Joseph, Public Pension Accounting Rules and Economic Outcomes (December 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2199067 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2199067

Contact Information

James P. Naughton
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
Reining Petacchi (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
100 Main Street
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
Joseph Peter Weber
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
77 Massachusetts Ave.
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-4310 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,083
Downloads: 313
Download Rank: 55,949
References:  16
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  25

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.407 seconds