Do Outside Directors Face Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment from the Financial Crisis
Steven M. Davidoff
Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law; Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance
Pace University School of Law
Robert J. Schonlau
Brigham Young University - Department of Finance
January 14, 2013
The exogenous shock of the financial crisis made shareholders and regulators particularly attuned to financial firm performance. We thus use the financial crisis as a natural experiment to study labor market consequences for outside directors at banks and other financial companies. Examining 6,507 director years at bank and financial companies over the period from 2006 to 2010 we find that outside director turnover at financial firms is negatively correlated to lagged variables for stock returns. However, the increased chance of being replaced for poor performance is only 0.99% for a one standard deviation change in performance compared to 0.59% at non-financial firms, in either case an arguably trivial amount. We also find limited evidence of salience with respect to the financial crisis. We draw on these empirical findings to assess current board-centered responses to the financial crisis and their failings.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34
Keywords: board of directors, financial institutions, financial crisis, labor market for directors, board turnover, corporate governance, outside directorsworking papers series
Date posted: January 14, 2013 ; Last revised: January 26, 2013
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