Do Outside Directors Face Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment from the Financial Crisis
Steven Davidoff Solomon
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law; University of California, Berkeley - Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy
Pace University School of Law
Robert J. Schonlau
Brigham Young University - Department of Finance
September 16, 2013
Harvard Business Law Review, Vol. 4, p. 53, 2014
The exogenous shock of the financial crisis made shareholders and regulators particularly attuned to financial firm performance. We thus use the financial crisis as a natural experiment to study labor market consequences for outside directors at banks and other financial companies. Examining 6,507 director years at bank and financial companies over the period from 2006 to 2010 we find that outside director turnover at financial firms is negatively correlated to lagged variables for stock returns. However, the increased chance of being replaced for poor performance is only 0.99% for a one standard deviation change in performance compared to 0.59% at non-financial firms, in either case an arguably trivial amount. We also find limited evidence of salience with respect to the financial crisis. We draw on these empirical findings to assess current board-centered responses to the financial crisis and their failings.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 32
Keywords: board of directors, financial institutions, financial crisis, labor market for directors, board turnover, corporate governance, outside directors
Date posted: January 14, 2013 ; Last revised: February 21, 2015
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