T. H. Green's Theory of Punishment
January 15, 2003
History of Political Thought, Vol. XXIV, pp. 685-701, 2003
Green agrees with Kant on the abstract character of moral law as categorical imperatives and that intentional dispositions are central to a moral justification of punishment. The central problem with Kant’s account is that we are unable to know these dispositions beyond a reasonable estimate. Green offers a practical alternative, positing moral law as an ideal to be achieved, but not immediately enforceable through positive law. Moral and positive law are bridged by Green’s theory of the common good through the dialectic of morality. Thus, Green appears to offer an alternative that remains committed to Kantian morality whilst taking proper stock of our cognitive limitations. Unfortunately, Green fails to unravel fully Kant’s dichotomy of moral and positive law that mirrors Green’s solution, although Green offers a number of improvements, such as the importance of the community in establishing rights and linking the severity of punishment to the extent that a criminal act threatens the continued maintenance of a system of rights.
Keywords: Green, Hegel, Kant, retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, unified theory, unified theory of punishment, punishment, natural law, positive law
JEL Classification: K00Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: January 16, 2013
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