Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2201773
 
 

References (22)



 
 

Citations (3)



 
 

Footnotes (8)



 


 



Open Access Versus Traditional Journal Pricing: Using a Simple 'Platform Market' Model to Understand Which Will Win (and Which Should)


Mark J. McCabe


Boston University - School of Management; University of Michigan - School of Information; SKEMA Business School Sophia Antipolis Nice

Christopher M. Snyder


Dartmouth College - Department of Economics

Anna Fagin


Dartmouth College - Department of Economics

November 2012


Abstract:     
Economists have built a theory to understand markets in which, rather than selling directly to buyers, suppliers sell through a platform, which controls prices on both sides. The theory has been applied to understand markets ranging from telephony, to credit cards, to media. In this paper, we apply the theory to the market for scholarly journals, with the journal functioning as the platform between submitting authors and subscribing readers. Our goal is to understand the conditions under which a journal would prefer open access to traditional pricing and under which open access would be better for the scholarly community. Our new model captures much of the richness of the existing economic literature on journal pricing, and indeed adds some fresh insights, yet is simple enough to be accessible to a broad audience.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: open access, journals, platform, competition, pricing

JEL Classification: D40, L31, L82

working papers series





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Date posted: January 17, 2013 ; Last revised: January 20, 2013

Suggested Citation

McCabe, Mark J. and Snyder, Christopher M. and Fagin, Anna, Open Access Versus Traditional Journal Pricing: Using a Simple 'Platform Market' Model to Understand Which Will Win (and Which Should) (November 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2201773 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2201773

Contact Information

Mark J. McCabe (Contact Author)
Boston University - School of Management ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States
University of Michigan - School of Information ( email )
SKEMA Business School Sophia Antipolis Nice ( email )
60 rue Dostoïevski
Sophia Antipolis, 06902
France
Christopher M. Snyder
Dartmouth College - Department of Economics ( email )
301 Rockefeller Hall
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
(603) 646-0642 (Phone)
(603) 646-2122 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~csnyder/
Anna Fagin
Dartmouth College - Department of Economics ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
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References:  22
Citations:  3
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