Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=220452
 
 

References (22)



 
 

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Political Institutions and Growth Collapses


Alejandro Gaviria


Fedesarrollo; Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics

Ugo Panizza


United Nations - Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEI)

Ernesto Stein


Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Jessica Seddon


Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS), Economics

March 2000


Abstract:     
This paper tests whether Rodrik's (1999) results that institutions for conflict management are associated with the ability to react to economic shocks are robust to different ways of defining the quality of such institutions. We measure the quality of conflict management institutions with two different indices. The first is an index of political constraints on the ability of the executive to impose its will. These constraints limit the ability of the government to arbitrarily change the rules of the game and therefore may reduce redistributive struggles. The second index measures the degree of political particularism. We define political particularism as the policymakers' ability to further their career by catering to narrow interests rather than broader national platforms. The indices used in this paper solve the endogeneity and subjectivity biases that affect Rodrik's main measure of institutional quality. We find strong support for the idea that high levels of political constraints and intermediate levels of political particularism are associated with a quick recovery from economic shocks.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

JEL Classification: D74, K1, O1

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Date posted: May 22, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Gaviria, Alejandro and Panizza, Ugo and Stein, Ernesto and Seddon, Jessica, Political Institutions and Growth Collapses (March 2000). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=220452 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.220452

Contact Information

Alejandro Gaviria (Contact Author)
Fedesarrollo ( email )
Calle 78 No 9-91
Santafe de Bogota, 75074
Colombia
571 3125300 (Phone)
571 212 6073 (Fax)
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics
Carrera 1a No. 18A-10
Santafe de Bogota, AA4976
Colombia

Ugo G. Panizza
United Nations - Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ( email )
Palais des Nations
Office E 8074
Geneva, 1211
Switzerland
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEI) ( email )
PO Box 136
Geneva, CH-1211
Switzerland
Ernesto Hugo Stein
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ( email )
1300 New York Avenue, NW
Research Department
Washington, DC 20577
United States

Jessica Seddon Wallack
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS), Economics ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519
United States
(858) 822 5733 (Phone)
(858) 534 3939 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  22
Citations:  7
Footnotes:  15

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