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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206883
 
 

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Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment
In Mexican High Schools


Jere Behrman


University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Susan Parker


Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) - Division of Economics

Petra Todd


University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Kenneth I. Wolpin


University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

October 1, 2012

PIER Working Paper No. 13-004

Abstract:     
This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentives schemes using data from a social experiment that randomized 88 Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students into three treatment groups and a control group. Treatment one provides individual incentives for performance on curriculum-based mathematics tests to students only, treatment two to teachers only and treatment three gives both individual and group incentives to students, teachers and school administrators. Program impact estimates reveal the largest average effects for treatment three, smaller impacts for treatment one and no impact for treatment two.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: student, teacher, and group incentives, randomized social experiment, Mexican high schools

JEL Classification: I2, O1

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Date posted: January 26, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Behrman, Jere and Parker, Susan and Todd, Petra and Wolpin, Kenneth I., Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment In Mexican High Schools (October 1, 2012). PIER Working Paper No. 13-004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206883 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2206883

Contact Information

Jere R. Behrman
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7704 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)
Susan Parker
Center for Research and Teaching of Economics (CIDE) - Division of Economics ( email )
Carretera Mexico Toluca 3655
01210 Mexico, D.F.
Mexico
Petra Todd (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Kenneth I. Wolpin
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7708 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)
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References:  24
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