Merger Control under China's Anti-Monopoly Law
D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center
January 27, 2013
NYU Journal of Law and Business 10:1-36 (2013)
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-05
This paper explores the factors that drive merger outcomes under China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). The paper overcomes the problem of a small number of published merger decisions through a unique practitioner survey of antitrust lawyers across multiple jurisdictions. This survey captures transactions contemplated, but never undertaken (deterred by the merger regime), as well as mergers notified for approval under the AML. The survey allows for broader inferences to be drawn about the development of Chinese antitrust. These include: the welfare standard used in merger analysis, what industrial policy and other political factors may impact merger enforcement, as well as issues of institutional design, transparency, and delay.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: mergers, antitrust, competition law, AML, China, empirical, public choice, industrial policy, transparency, fairness
JEL Classification: P30, K21, L40, G34, F23
Date posted: January 27, 2013 ; Last revised: September 23, 2015
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