Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2207690
 
 

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Merger Control under China's Anti-Monopoly Law


D. Daniel Sokol


University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

January 27, 2013

NYU Journal of Law and Business 10:1-36 (2013)
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-05

Abstract:     
This paper explores the factors that drive merger outcomes under China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). The paper overcomes the problem of a small number of published merger decisions through a unique practitioner survey of antitrust lawyers across multiple jurisdictions. This survey captures transactions contemplated, but never undertaken (deterred by the merger regime), as well as mergers notified for approval under the AML. The survey allows for broader inferences to be drawn about the development of Chinese antitrust. These include: the welfare standard used in merger analysis, what industrial policy and other political factors may impact merger enforcement, as well as issues of institutional design, transparency, and delay.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: mergers, antitrust, competition law, AML, China, empirical, public choice, industrial policy, transparency, fairness

JEL Classification: P30, K21, L40, G34, F23

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Date posted: January 27, 2013 ; Last revised: August 30, 2014

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel, Merger Control under China's Anti-Monopoly Law (January 27, 2013). NYU Journal of Law and Business 10:1-36 (2013); Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-05. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2207690 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2207690

Contact Information

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )
Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol
George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )
200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States
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