Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209636
 
 

Footnotes (226)



 


 



A Deference Theory of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act


Arpit K. Garg


Yale Law School

April 1, 2012


Abstract:     
Although Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) is one of the most documented topics in legal scholarship, the academy has missed a crucial reading: a statute with an administrative agency, the Department of Justice (DOJ), entitled to Chevron-style deference. Because the topic is virtually unexplored, this Note is the first to outline how we might understand a deference theory of the VRA. In addition to articulating the theoretical case and exploring the historical evidence of deference in the Supreme Court, this Note offers a descriptive/normative explanation for the Court’s current hostile relationship towards the DOJ on Section 5 voting rights issues, what I term 'anti-deference.' Such insights represent the tip of the iceberg for what a deference theory of the VRA might unearth.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: February 1, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Garg, Arpit K., A Deference Theory of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (April 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209636 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2209636

Contact Information

Arpit Kumar Garg (Contact Author)
Yale Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 282
Downloads: 38
Footnotes:  226

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.250 seconds