Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209659
 


 



Bricks, Beer and Shoes: Indirect Purchaser Standing in the European Union and the United States


Andrea Hamilton


McDermott, Will and Emery (Brussels Office)

David Henry


McDermott, Will and Emery (Brussels Office)

2012

Global Competition Litigation Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, October 2012

Abstract:     
Mature antitrust regimes typically prioritize two main enforcement goals: deterrence and compensation of those injured by anti-competitive conduct. The simultaneous pursuit of these goals, however, creates difficulties for policymakers and enforcers that seek to strike a balance between public and private enforcement. Public enforcement is seen as the optimal means for achieving deterrence, through the imposition of high fines and (in some jurisdictions) individual sanctions. On the other hand, public enforcement in its current form does little to compensate businesses and individuals that incur injury as a result of anti-competitive conduct. Antitrust regulators on both sides of the Atlantic generally agree that private enforcement is the mechanism best placed to pursue the compensation objective. This short paper, therefore, seeks to explore the issue of indirect purchaser standing to pursue private damages actions and to contribute to the current discussion by comparing the treatment of indirect purchasers in the United States and European Union.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: comparative law, competition law claims, damages, EU law, indirect purchasers, locus standi, private enforcement, United States

JEL Classification: K21, K40, L40, D60

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Date posted: February 1, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Hamilton, Andrea and Henry, David, Bricks, Beer and Shoes: Indirect Purchaser Standing in the European Union and the United States (2012). Global Competition Litigation Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, October 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209659

Contact Information

Andrea Hamilton
McDermott, Will and Emery (Brussels Office) ( email )
Avenue des Nerviens 9-31
Brussels, 1040
Belgium
David Henry (Contact Author)
McDermott, Will and Emery (Brussels Office) ( email )
Avenue des Nerviens 9-31
Brussels, 1040
Belgium
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