Antitrust Fines in Times of Crisis
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Departamento de Economia
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9290
In a model in which firms can go bankrupt because of adverse market shocks or antitrust fines, we find that even large corporate fines may not be able to induce deterrence. Managerial penalties are thus needed. If the policy may be changed according to the state of the business cycle, then the optimal outcome can always be achieved through antitrust fines that are more severe in good times and more lenient in bad times. A time-independent policy may result in either too many bankruptcies or under-deterrence as compared to the optimal policy.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23
Keywords: antitrust fines, business cycles, managing incentives
JEL Classification: K14, K42, L13working papers series
Date posted: February 1, 2013
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