Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Georgia State University
Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad
February 1, 2013
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA), Forthcoming
We develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms affect innovation. We show that there is a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private benefits of control. We show strong empirical support for the predicted relation using ex ante and ex post innovation measures. We exploit the variation in takeover pressure created by the passage of anti-takeover laws across different states. Innovation is fostered either by an unhindered market for corporate control, or by anti-takeover laws that are severe enough to effectively deter takeovers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 80
Date posted: February 3, 2013 ; Last revised: May 8, 2013
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