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What Evidence Scholars Can Learn from the Work of Stephen Yeazell: History, Rulemaking, and the Lawyer's Fundamental Conflict


David Alan Sklansky


Stanford Law School

February 1, 2013

UCLA Law Review Discourse, Vol.60, Iss. 6, August 2013
UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2210639

Abstract:     
This short essay, written for a symposium honoring the extraordinary career of Professor Steven Yeazell, draws three lessons for evidence scholars from Yeazell’s justly celebrated work in civil procedure. The first lesson is to take history seriously, but to be realistic about what it can tell us: to use history to gain perspective, not to recover lost wisdom. The second lesson is to take rulemaking seriously: to think about the processes through which evidence rules are formulated and reformed. The third lesson, and the most important, is to take lawyers seriously, not just as the agents through which procedure is implemented but as drivers and obstructers of reform.

That’s an especially critical lesson for evidence scholars, because the complexity and opacity of evidence law has meant that lawyers are generally the only ones in a position to improve it. And lawyers’ interests diverge in important ways from society’s interests. In particular, lawyers tend to view uncritically, and sometimes even to celebrate, the extraordinary degree to which our system of adjudication, and evidence law in particular, makes a party’s prospects in litigation hinge on the skills of the party’s lawyer. That feature of evidence rules and of our procedural system more broadly usually passes unnoticed, in large part because lawyers find it not only unobjectionable but deeply attractive. But from society’s standpoint, procedural rules work best — all things being equal — when they make the outcome of litigation turn on the merits of the case: on who is right and who is wrong, on what justice demands, not on the relative skills of the lawyers involved. We ask too rarely whether our procedural rules, including our rules of evidence, place too large a premium on lawyerly skill, and whether the culture of the legal profession, and its attachment to a certain heroic image of the trial lawyer, has warped the way that lawyers have struck that balance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: Yeazell, evidence, civil procedure, criminal procedure, rulemaking

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Date posted: February 3, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Sklansky, David Alan, What Evidence Scholars Can Learn from the Work of Stephen Yeazell: History, Rulemaking, and the Lawyer's Fundamental Conflict (February 1, 2013). UCLA Law Review Discourse, Vol.60, Iss. 6, August 2013; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2210639. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2210639

Contact Information

David Alan Sklansky (Contact Author)
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
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