Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212914
 
 

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Claim Efficiencies or Offer Remedies? An Analysis of Litigation Strategies in EC Mergers


Peter L. Ormosi


University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy; Norwich Business School

November 30, 2012

International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 30, No. 6, 2012

Abstract:     
Efficiency defence and merger remedies are key components in most merger control regimes. Although in many jurisdictions both the provision of efficiency-related evidence and remedy offers are at the merging firms' discretion, most previous works have only analysed them separately. This paper is an attempt to empirically model the system of decisions that firms face in merger litigation where they are allowed to choose what combination of efficiency claims and settlement offers to make. The main novelty of this work is the use of data from company reports on the merger-generated synergy expectations signalled to shareholders, which allows the direct empirical testing of some of the assumptions and findings from previous works. Evidence is presented that the current EC merger control regime is incapable of extracting information from firms on their efficiency expectations and the identity and experience of the legal advisor plays a key role in this; that pre-merger synergy expectations enhance the willingness to offer remedies; and finally, that the cost of delay plays a central role in designing firms' litigation strategy, especially when these costs exceed the cost of the remedy.

Keywords: Merger litigation, Merger remedies, Synergies, Efficiency defence

JEL Classification: K21, K41, L40, L41

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: February 7, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Ormosi, Peter L., Claim Efficiencies or Offer Remedies? An Analysis of Litigation Strategies in EC Mergers (November 30, 2012). International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 30, No. 6, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212914

Contact Information

Peter L. Ormosi (Contact Author)
University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Competition Policy ( email )
UEA
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ
United Kingdom
Norwich Business School ( email )
Norwich
NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
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