Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213675
 


 



Does International Law Matter?


Shima Baradaran


University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law

Michael Findley


University of Texas at Austin

Daniel Nielson


Brigham Young University

J. C. Sharman


Griffith University

February 7, 2013

97 Minnesota Law Review 743 (2013)

Abstract:     
The importance of international law has grown in an increasingly global world. States and their citizens are interconnected and depend on each other to enforce and comply with international law to meet common goals. Despite the expanding presence of international law, the question that remains is whether international law matters. Do individuals comply with international law? And when they comply, do they comply because they fear penalties or because they desire to behave appropriately? This Article presents results from a randomized field experiment designed to investigate these questions. Major findings include that roughly one in seven international actors is willing to violate international law and the existence of penalties actually motivates some actors to break international law in greater numbers. In the first and largest global field experiment to date, this Article not only advances the scope of research methods generally, but also marks new ground by providing theoretical insights on the central questions of international law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 95

Keywords: International law, randomized controlled trial, global field experiment, constructivism, rationalism, managerial theory, penalty, international alw, compliance, norms, shell companies, incorporation transparency, financial action task force, FATF, OECD, tax haven, terrorism, corruption

JEL Classification: K33, C93, F23, G15

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: February 8, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Baradaran, Shima and Findley, Michael and Nielson, Daniel and Sharman, J. C., Does International Law Matter? (February 7, 2013). 97 Minnesota Law Review 743 (2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213675

Contact Information

Shima Baradaran (Contact Author)
University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law ( email )
332 S. 1400 East Front
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0730
United States

Michael Findley
University of Texas at Austin ( email )
Austin, TX 78712
United States
Daniel Nielson
Brigham Young University ( email )
Provo, UT 84602
United States
J.C. Sharman
Griffith University
Parklands Drive
Southport, Queensland QLD 4215
Australia
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