Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214709
 


 



The Financial Stability Board: The New Politics of International Financial Regulation


Stavros Gadinis


University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

February 10, 2013

48 Texas International Law Journal 157 (2013)

Abstract:     
In response to the 2007-08 financial crisis, the G20 forged the Financial Stability Board, a new international body whose core mission is to promote the regulatory standards that best ensure the stability and soundness of the financial system. The FSB is an umbrella organization: its membership includes representatives from international standard-setters like the Basel Committee and the International Accounting Standards Board, alongside domestic regulators, such as central banks, and representatives from national finance ministries and treasury departments. The participation of political appointees in the FSB, this Article argues, sets it apart from other international bodies in financial regulation. Through the FSB, elected politicians can shape international financial regulation in ways not available to them in the past. This Article has identified three ways in which the G20 governments intervene in international financial regulation: through promoting specific amendments in international rulemakers’ existing standards, through setting entirely new policymaking initiatives, and through intensifying efforts to monitor compliance with international rules at the domestic level. The Article offers extensive evidence from the interaction between the G-20, the FSB, other international bodies and domestic authorities.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: Financial Stability Board, FSB, Basel, IOSCO, IASB, financial crisis, 2007 crisis, G-20

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Date posted: February 10, 2013 ; Last revised: May 15, 2013

Suggested Citation

Gadinis, Stavros, The Financial Stability Board: The New Politics of International Financial Regulation (February 10, 2013). 48 Texas International Law Journal 157 (2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214709

Contact Information

Stavros Gadinis (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
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