On the Wrong Side of the Law - Causes and Consequences of a Corrupt Judiciary
University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics
February 10, 2013
Empirical research on the determinants of corruption has made substantial progress over the last decade. To date, the consequences of different structures of the legal enforcement institutions have, however, only played a marginal role. This contribution deals with both the determinants of corruption in the judiciary and the consequences of judicial organization for corruption at large. Regarding the latter, it is shown that the factual independence of the judiciary as well as that of prosecution agencies is correlated with lower levels of corruption. This is also true for a third indicator that measures the degree to which judges are held accountable for their decisions (“judicial accountability”). Furthermore, independence and accountability function as complements in preventing corruption – individually judicial accountability can be ineffective, judicial independence alone can even be damaging.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25
Keywords: Corruption, Judiciary, Judicial Independence, Prosecutorial Independence, Judicial Accountability
JEL Classification: K42, P51working papers series
Date posted: February 11, 2013
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