Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214728
 


 



On the Wrong Side of the Law - Causes and Consequences of a Corrupt Judiciary


Stefan Voigt


University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Jerg Gutmann


University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics

February 10, 2013


Abstract:     
Empirical research on the determinants of corruption has made substantial progress over the last decade. To date, the consequences of different structures of the legal enforcement institutions have, however, only played a marginal role. This contribution deals with both the determinants of corruption in the judiciary and the consequences of judicial organization for corruption at large. Regarding the latter, it is shown that the actual independence of the judiciary as well as that of prosecution agencies is correlated with lower levels of corruption. This is also true for a third indicator that measures the degree to which judges are held accountable for their decisions (“judicial accountability”). Furthermore, independence and accountability function as complements in preventing corruption – judicial accountability without independence appears to be ineffective, whereas judicial or prosecutorial independence alone can even have adverse effects.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Corruption, Judiciary, Judicial Independence, Prosecutorial Independence, Judicial Accountability

JEL Classification: K42, P51

working papers series


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Date posted: February 11, 2013 ; Last revised: January 15, 2014

Suggested Citation

Voigt, Stefan and Gutmann, Jerg, On the Wrong Side of the Law - Causes and Consequences of a Corrupt Judiciary (February 10, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214728 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2214728

Contact Information

Stefan Voigt (Contact Author)
University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )
Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Jerg Gutmann
University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics ( email )
Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49(0)-40-42838-3040 (Phone)
+49(0)-40-42838-6794 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.jura.uni-hamburg.de/personen/gutmann/
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