Measuring Unilateral Effects in Partial Acquisitions
New University of Lisbon
Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa
Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP)
February 11, 2013
Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial acquisitions involving pure financial interests and/or effective corporate control on prices, market shares, firm profi ts and consumer welfare. The proposed methodology can deal with differentiated products industries, with both direct and indirect partial ownership interests and nests full mergers (100% fi nancial and control acquisitions) as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: Antitrust, Unilateral Effects, Partial Acquisitions, Oligopoly, Differentiated Products, Demand Estimation
JEL Classification: D12, C54, L13, L41, L66
Date posted: February 12, 2013
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