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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2215753
 
 

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Corporate Governance and Green Innovations


Mario Daniele Amore


Bocconi University

Morten Bennedsen


INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences

February 19, 2014


Abstract:     
We present evidence of corporate governance effects on firms’ environmental performance. Using changes in takeover legislation as exogenous variations in corporate governance quality, we show that worse-governed firms generate fewer green patents relative to all their innovations. This effect is greater for firms with a smaller share of institutional ownership, with a smaller stock of green patents, and operating in states with lower pollution abatement costs and in industries less dependent on energy inputs. Our results suggest that worse-governed managers avoid complex projects that would entail major changes in the organization and composition of the employment.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: corporate governance, environment, patents

JEL Classification: G34, O31, Q20

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Date posted: February 13, 2013 ; Last revised: February 19, 2014

Suggested Citation

Amore, Mario Daniele and Bennedsen, Morten, Corporate Governance and Green Innovations (February 19, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2215753 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2215753

Contact Information

Mario Daniele Amore (Contact Author)
Bocconi University ( email )
Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy
Morten Bennedsen
INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )
Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

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