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Corporate Governance and Green Innovations

Mario Daniele Amore

Bocconi University

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences

February 19, 2014

We present evidence of corporate governance effects on firms’ environmental performance. Using changes in takeover legislation as exogenous variations in corporate governance quality, we show that worse-governed firms generate fewer green patents relative to all their innovations. This effect is greater for firms with a smaller share of institutional ownership, with a smaller stock of green patents, and operating in states with lower pollution abatement costs and in industries less dependent on energy inputs. Our results suggest that worse-governed managers avoid complex projects that would entail major changes in the organization and composition of the employment.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: corporate governance, environment, patents

JEL Classification: G34, O31, Q20

working papers series

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Date posted: February 13, 2013 ; Last revised: February 19, 2014

Suggested Citation

Amore, Mario Daniele and Bennedsen, Morten, Corporate Governance and Green Innovations (February 19, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2215753 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2215753

Contact Information

Mario Daniele Amore (Contact Author)
Bocconi University ( email )
Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Morten Bennedsen
INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )
Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex


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References:  49
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