References (36)


Citations (1)


Footnotes (4)



Universally Stable Adjustment Processes: A Unifying Approach

P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Maastricht University

February 2000

Both in game theory and in general equilibrium theory there exists a number of universally stable adjustment processes. In game theory these processes typically serve the role of selecting a Nash equilibrium. Examples are the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten or the equilibrium selection procedure proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey. In general equilibrium the processes are adjustment rules by which an auctioneer can clear all markets. Examples are the processes studied by Smale, Kamiya, van der Laan and Talman, and Herings. The underlying reasons for convergence have remained rather mysterious in the literature, and convergence of different processes has seemed unrelated. This paper shows that convergence of all these processes relies on Browder's fixed point theorem.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Adjustment processes, game theory, general equilibrium, universal convergence

JEL Classification: C62, C63, C68, C72

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: August 16, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, Universally Stable Adjustment Processes: A Unifying Approach (February 2000). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=221748 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.221748

Contact Information

P. Jean-Jacques Herings (Contact Author)
Maastricht University ( email )
Department of Economics
P.O. Box 616
6200 MD Maastricht
+31 43 3883636 (Phone)
+31 43 3884878 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.personeel.unimaas.nl/p.herings/herings.htm
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 602
Downloads: 62
Download Rank: 238,138
References:  36
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  4

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.282 seconds