References (16)


Citations (1)



The Agency Model and MFN Clauses

Justin P. Johnson

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

January 10, 2014

I investigate the "agency model" of sales, in which suppliers set retail prices and share revenue with retailers. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not the case that the agency model eliminates double markups; retailers continue to impose a markup because the revenue-sharing contracts they select distort the perceived marginal cost of suppliers. Nonetheless, when retailers compete in revenue shares, adopting the agency model lowers retail prices and industry profits. Yet, retailers' profits increase. Most-favored nation clauses that stipulate retail price parity can facilitate the emergence of high industry prices, but in some cases may also raise market-entry incentives and benefit consumers. My results provide an explanation for why many online retailers have adopted the agency model and MFN clauses.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: February 14, 2013 ; Last revised: May 23, 2014

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Justin P., The Agency Model and MFN Clauses (January 10, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2217849 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2217849

Contact Information

Justin P. Johnson (Contact Author)
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,316
Downloads: 725
Download Rank: 24,544
References:  16
Citations:  1
People who downloaded this paper also downloaded:
1. Search Intermediaries
By Xianwen Shi and Aloysius Siow

2. Selling Through Referrals
By Daniele Condorelli, Andrea Galeotti, ...

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.188 seconds