Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2219554
 
 

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Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change


Kenneth W. Abbott


Arizona State University

February 9, 2013

Forthcoming, Transnational Environmental Law

Abstract:     
The inadequacies of the inter-state institutions and negotiating processes central to international climate policy create a pressing need for innovative modes of governance. This paper proposes one promising and feasible approach: strengthening the existing transnational regime complex for climate change. Leading organizations could strengthen the regime complex by forging stronger links among institutions, increasing coordination and collaboration, supporting weaker institutions and encouraging the entry of new ones where governance gaps exist. An enhanced regime complex would have a multi-level structure, enabling transnational institutions to directly engage, address and support sub-state and societal actors at multiple levels of authority and scale. In this way the transnational regime complex would bypass recalcitrant national governments. It would also help manage recalcitrant states by focusing advocacy, creating demonstration effects and otherwise mobilizing pressure on governments. Regime entrepreneurs using the strategy of orchestration could deploy a range of incentives and other tools of influence to enroll, support and steer transnational organizations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: climate change, transnational governance, non-state actors, regime complex, multi-level governance, polycentric governance

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Date posted: February 18, 2013 ; Last revised: August 24, 2013

Suggested Citation

Abbott, Kenneth W., Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change (February 9, 2013). Forthcoming, Transnational Environmental Law. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2219554 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2219554

Contact Information

Kenneth Wayne Abbott (Contact Author)
Arizona State University ( email )
Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
480-965-5917 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


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