Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224287
 
 

References (49)



 
 

Footnotes (53)



 


 



Anatomy of Cartel Contracts


Ari Hyytinen


University of Jyväskylä - School of Business and Economics

Frode Steen


Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Otto Toivanen


KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FBE); CEPR

February 2013

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9362

Abstract:     
We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing cartels. One third of the clauses relate to raising profits; the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats. Cartels use three main approaches to raise profits: Price, market allocation, and specialization. These appear to be substitutes. Choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability. Simplifying, we find that large cartels agree on prices, cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets, and small cartels avoid competition through specialization.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

Keywords: antitrust, cartels, competition policy, contracts, industry heterogeneity

JEL Classification: K12, L40, L41

working papers series


Date posted: February 26, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Hyytinen, Ari and Steen, Frode and Toivanen, Otto, Anatomy of Cartel Contracts (February 2013). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9362. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224287

Contact Information

Ari Hyytinen
University of Jyvaskyla - School of Business and Economics ( email )
PO Box 35
PO Box 35 FIN-40014 University of Jyväskylä
FIN 40351, FIN-40014
Finland
Frode Steen
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics ( email )
Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway
+47 55 959 259 (Phone)
+47 55 959 543 (Fax)

Otto Toivanen
KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FBE) ( email )
Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
CEPR ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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References:  49
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