Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224731
 
 

Footnotes (20)



 


 



Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Competition?


Philipp Denter


University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science

Dana Sisak


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute

October 13, 2013

EPSA 2013 Annual General Conference Paper 230

Abstract:     
We explore how public opinion polls affect candidates' campaign spending in political competition. Generally, polls lead to asymmetric behavior. Under a majority rule there always exists an equilibrium in which the initially more popular candidate invests more in the campaign and thereby increases his lead in expectation: polls create momentum. When campaigning is very effective and the race is very close, a second type of equilibrium may exist: the trailing candidate outspends and overtakes his opponent. Regardless of the type of equilibrium, polls have a tendency to decrease expected total campaigning expenditures by amplifying ex-ante asymmetries between candidates and thus defusing competition. When candidates care also for their vote share in addition to having the majority, candidates' incentives crucially depend on the distribution of voters' candidate preferences.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 68

Keywords: polls, political campaigns, feedback, momentum

JEL Classification: D02, D72, D74, D83

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: May 2, 2013 ; Last revised: October 15, 2013

Suggested Citation

Denter, Philipp and Sisak, Dana, Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Competition? (October 13, 2013). EPSA 2013 Annual General Conference Paper 230. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224731

Contact Information

Philipp Denter
University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science ( email )
Varnbüelstrasse 19
St. Gallen, 9000
Switzerland
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/philippdenter/
Dana Sisak (Contact Author)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 162
Downloads: 13
Footnotes:  20

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.265 seconds