Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228742
 


 



Ring-Fencing


Steven L. Schwarcz


Duke University - School of Law

August 13, 2013

Southern California Law Review, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
“Ring-fencing” is often touted as a regulatory solution to problems in banking, finance, public utilities, and insurance. However, both the precise meaning of ring-fencing, as well as the nature of the problems that ring-fencing regulation purports to solve, are ill defined. This article examines the functions and conceptual foundations of ring-fencing. In a regulatory context, the term can best be understood as legally deconstructing a firm in order to more optimally reallocate and reduce risk. So utilized, ring-fencing can help to protect certain publicly beneficial activities performed by private-sector firms, as well as to mitigate systemic risk and the too-big-to-fail problem inherent in large financial institutions. If not structured carefully, however, ring-fencing can inadvertently undermine efficiency and externalize costs.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: ring-fencing, systemic risk, risk management, Volcker Rule

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Date posted: March 6, 2013 ; Last revised: August 14, 2013

Suggested Citation

Schwarcz, Steven L., Ring-Fencing (August 13, 2013). Southern California Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228742 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2228742

Contact Information

Steven L. Schwarcz (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7060 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)
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