Policing the Firm
D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida - Levin College of Law; University of Minnesota School of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center
March 7, 2013
Notre Dame Law Review, Forthcoming
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-13
Criminal price fixing cartels are a serious problem for consumers. Cartels are hard to both find and punish. Research into other kinds of corporate wrongdoing suggests that enforcers should pay increased attention to incentives within the firm to deter wrong-doing. Thus far, antitrust scholarship and policy have ignored this insight. This article suggests how to improve antitrust enforcement by focusing its efforts on changing the incentives of internal firm compliance.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 66
Keywords: price fixing, corporate wrongdoing, antitrust enforcement, cartels, compliance, leniency, price fixing, corporate crime, FCPA
JEL Classification: K21, L41, M14Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 9, 2013 ; Last revised: March 25, 2013
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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