Abstract

 


 



The City Chaotic: Urban Physical Disorder and the Negative Rule of Law


Simone M. Sepe


University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law

Brent T. White


University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law

May 16, 2013

Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 13-15

Abstract:     
This article argues that urban physical disorder weakens the relational social contract upon which the rule of law is built. Under this social contract, citizens follow legal rules in exchange for certain goods and services from the government, and citizens conditionally cooperate with each other, following the rules because others follow the rules as well. Urban physical disorder, as evidenced by crumbling urban infrastructure, signals both that the government is not fulfilling its obligations under the social contract and that others are not following the rules, contributing to a downward spiral that ultimately leads to a culture unsupportive of the rule of law.

To test this theoretical account, this article analyzes empirical data from 124 countries related to the quality of the urban environment and the degree of commitment to the rule of law, as measured by perceived corruption. This analysis shows that the rule of law is both strongly correlated and causally dependent upon the quality of the urban environment. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that austerity is an effective means of controlling corruption, this article thus suggests that public investment in urban infrastructure and the creation of quality urban environments are essential components of efforts to cultivate and maintain the rule of law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Rule of Law, law and economics, law and development, corruption, urban environment, social contract

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Date posted: March 11, 2013 ; Last revised: May 17, 2013

Suggested Citation

Sepe, Simone M. and White, Brent T., The City Chaotic: Urban Physical Disorder and the Negative Rule of Law (May 16, 2013). Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 13-15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2230652 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2230652

Contact Information

Simone M. Sepe
University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 210176
Tucson, AZ 85721-0176
United States
Brent T. White (Contact Author)
University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 210176
Tucson, AZ 85721-0176
United States
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