Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2230996
 


 



Why Does Balanced News Produce Unbalanced Views?


Edward L. Glaeser


Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Cass R. Sunstein


Harvard Law School

April 3, 2013


Abstract:     
Many studies find that presentation of balanced information, offering competing positions, can promote polarization and thus increase preexisting social divisions. We offer two explanations for this apparently puzzling phenomenon. The first involves what we call asymmetric Bayesianism: the same information can have diametrically opposite effects if those who receive it have opposing antecedent convictions. Recipients whose beliefs are buttressed by the message, or a relevant part, rationally believe that it is true, while recipients whose beliefs are at odds with that message, or a relevant part, rationally believe that the message is false (and may reflect desperation). The second explanation is that the same information can activate radically different memories and associated convictions, thus producing polarized responses to that information, or what we call a memory boomerang. An understanding of these explanations reveals when balanced news will produce unbalanced views. The explanations also account for the potential influence of “surprising validators.” Because such validators are credible to the relevant audience, they can reduce the likelihood of asymmetric Bayesianism, thus promoting agreement.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: polarization, Bayesian updating, biased assimilation, memory, belief formation

JEL Classification: D70, D80, D83, K00

working papers series


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Date posted: March 11, 2013 ; Last revised: April 7, 2013

Suggested Citation

Glaeser, Edward L. and Sunstein, Cass R., Why Does Balanced News Produce Unbalanced Views? (April 3, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2230996 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2230996

Contact Information

Edward L. Glaeser
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Room 315A
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2150 (Phone)
617-496-1722 (Fax)
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Cass R. Sunstein (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts Ave
Areeda Hall 225
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2291 (Phone)
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