International Delegations and Administrative Law
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Law School
January 1, 2007
Maryland Law Review, Vol. 66, 2007
Effective regulation in fields like the environment, consumer safety, and public health demands nimble responses to new information and changing circumstances. For this reason, treaties that address these topics are not designed to be static documents. These treaties frequently include mechanisms that allow parties to adjust their international obligations over time without going through the formal process of amendment and ratification. This feature of regulatory treaties makes some commentators nervous, especially when it is combined with federal statutory provisions that direct administrative agencies to incorporate those revised international obligations into U.S. law. Specifically, some scholars have suggested that this combination of treaties and implementing legislation is unconstitutional because it delegates to international institutions power that should be held exclusively by the federal government. This Article argues that legislation that pre-commits the United States to implementing such international obligations survives constitutional scrutiny.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
Keywords: international delegations, foreign affairs, Montreal Protocol
JEL Classification: K32, K33Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 12, 2013
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