Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers
University of Missouri at Columbia
Berk A. Sensoy
Ohio State University - Fisher College of Business
Michael S. Weisbach
Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
July 30, 2013
Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2013-03-06
Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper Series No. 2013-06
Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of new capital, leading to higher future fees. We quantify the magnitude of indirect performance incentives for hedge fund managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows as lags increase up to two years. Conservative estimates indicate that indirect incentives for the average fund are four times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers’ own investment in the fund. For new funds, indirect incentives are seven times as large as direct incentives. Combining direct and indirect incentives, for each dollar generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to 75 cents in direct performance fees plus the present value of future fees over the expected life of the fund. Older and capacity constrained funds have considerably weaker relations between future flows and performance, leading to weaker indirect incentives. There is no evidence that direct contractual incentives are stronger when market-based indirect incentives are weaker.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48
Keywords: Hedge Funds, Incentives, Performance, Flows
JEL Classification: G11, G23working papers series
Date posted: March 16, 2013 ; Last revised: July 31, 2013
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