Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233670
 
 

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Worth Keeping but Not Exceeding: Asymmetric Consequences of Breaking versus Exceeding Promises


Ayelet Gneezy


University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Nicholas Epley


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

November 10, 2011


Abstract:     
Promises are social contracts that can be broken, kept, or exceeded. Breaking one's promise is evaluated more negatively than keeping one's promise. Does expending more effort to exceed a promise lead to equivalently more positive evaluations? Although linear in their outcomes, we expected an asymmetry in evaluations of broken, kept, and exceeded promises. Whereas breaking one's promise is obviously negative compared to keeping a promise, we predicted that exceeding one's promise would not be evaluated more positively than merely keeping a promise. Three sets of experiments involving hypothetical, recalled, and actual promises support these predictions. A final experiment suggests this asymmetry comes from overvaluing kept promises rather than undervaluing exceeded promises. We propse this pattern may reflect a general tendency in social systems to discourage selfishness and reward cooperation. Breaking one's promise is costly, but exceeding it does not appear worth the effort.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: Promises, Fairness, Trust

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Date posted: March 14, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Gneezy, Ayelet and Epley, Nicholas, Worth Keeping but Not Exceeding: Asymmetric Consequences of Breaking versus Exceeding Promises (November 10, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2233670

Contact Information

Ayelet Gneezy (Contact Author)
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States
Nicholas Epley
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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