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Regulation of Stock Externalities With Learning


Larry S. Karp


University of California, Berkeley

Jiangfeng Zhang


University of California, Berkeley
January 19, 2001

UC at Berkeley Dept. of Agricultural & Resource Economics Working Paper No. 892

Abstract:     
We study the situation where firms' actions contribute to a stock externality. The regulator and firms have asymmetric information about serially correlated (abatement) costs. With price-based policies such as taxes, the regulator learns about the evolution of both stock and costs. This ability to learn is important in determining the ranking of taxes and quotas, and in determining the value of a feedback rather than an open-loop policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: Pollution control, asymmetric information, learning, correlated costs, choice of instruments

JEL Classification: H21, Q28

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Date posted: February 5, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Karp, Larry S. and Zhang, Jiangfeng, Regulation of Stock Externalities With Learning (January 19, 2001). UC at Berkeley Dept. of Agricultural & Resource Economics Working Paper No. 892. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=223507 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.223507

Contact Information

Larry S. Karp (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley ( email )
Dept. of Agriculture & Resource Economics
313 Giannini Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-7199 (Phone)
510-643-8911 (Fax)
Jiangfeng Zhang
University of California, Berkeley ( email )
310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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