Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2236201
 
 

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What Do We Know About High-Frequency Trading?


Charles M. Jones


Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics

March 20, 2013

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 13-11

Abstract:     
This paper reviews recent theoretical and empirical research on high-frequency trading (HFT). Economic theory identifies several ways that HFT could affect liquidity. The main positive is that HFT can intermediate trades at lower cost. However, HFT speed could disadvantage other investors, and the resulting adverse selection could reduce market quality.

Over the past decade, HFT has increased sharply, and liquidity has steadily improved. But correlation is not necessarily causation. Empirically, the challenge is to measure the incremental effect of HFT beyond other changes in equity markets. The best papers for this purpose isolate market structure changes that facilitate HFT. Virtually every time a market structure change results in more HFT, liquidity and market quality have improved because liquidity suppliers are better able to adjust their quotes in response to new information.

Does HFT make markets more fragile? In the May 6, 2010 Flash Crash, for example, HFT initially stabilized prices but were eventually overwhelmed, and in liquidating their positions, HFT exacerbated the downturn. This appears to be a generic feature of equity markets: similar events have occurred in manual markets, even with affirmative market-maker obligations. Well-crafted individual stock price limits and trading halts have been introduced since. Similarly, kill switches are a sensible response to the Knight trading episode.

Many of the regulatory issues associated with HFT are the same issues that arose in more manual markets. Now regulators in the US are appropriately relying on competition to minimize abuses. Other regulation is appropriate if there are market failures. For instance, consolidated order-level audit trails are key to robust enforcement. If excessive messages impose negative externalities on others, fees are appropriate. But a message tax may act like a transaction tax, reducing share prices, increasing volatility, and worsening liquidity. Minimum order exposure times would also severely discourage liquidity provision.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

Keywords: algorithmic trading, automated markets, securities transaction tax

JEL Classification: G14

working papers series





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Date posted: March 21, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Jones, Charles M., What Do We Know About High-Frequency Trading? (March 20, 2013). Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 13-11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2236201 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2236201

Contact Information

Charles M. Jones (Contact Author)
Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
(212) 854-5553 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~cj88/

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