Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2237685
 


 



Campaign Contributions from Corporate Executives in Lieu of Political Action Committees


Brian Kelleher Richter


University of Texas at Austin - Red McCombs School of Business

Timothy Werner


University of Texas at Austin - Red McCombs School of Business

July 12, 2013


Abstract:     
To distance themselves from the specter of special-interests, some Congressional candidates instituted personal bans on campaign contributions from corporate-linked political action committees (PACs). We leverage these to identify how corporate executives adapt their personal campaign contribution patterns in response to restrictions applied only to corporate-linked PACs but not to executives as individuals. In a newly constructed dataset, with 6,803,661 observations, that includes all CEO-firm-candidate contribution pairs for active S&P500 firms over an 18-year period, we find that corporate executives increase personal giving to specific candidates in lieu of their corporate-linked PACs in a form of cross-actor substitution among corporate-linked sources of campaign contributions. This finding has important implications for regulatory design in scenarios where cross-actor substitution is possible. Vis-à-vis campaign finance regulation, it suggests that bans on corporate-linked PAC contributions alone cannot prevent corporate-linked money from finding its way into candidates’ campaign coffers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

Keywords: Campaign Contributions, Regulation, Political Action Committees, Corporate Executives

JEL Classification: D72, L51

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: March 23, 2013 ; Last revised: July 13, 2013

Suggested Citation

Richter, Brian Kelleher and Werner, Timothy, Campaign Contributions from Corporate Executives in Lieu of Political Action Committees (July 12, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2237685 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2237685

Contact Information

Brian Kelleher Richter (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Austin - Red McCombs School of Business ( email )
2100 Speedway
B6500, CBA 5.250
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-232-6751 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://briankrichter.com/
Timothy Werner
University of Texas at Austin - Red McCombs School of Business ( email )
United States
5122326844 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://timothywerner.com
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 689
Downloads: 89
Download Rank: 169,649

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.296 seconds