Boards, Auditors, Attorneys and Compliance with Mandatory SEC Disclosure Rules
Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business
Jason D. Schloetzer
Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business
April 19, 2013
Managerial & Decision Economics, Forthcoming
We survey the empirical literature on the determinants of firms’ compliance with mandatory SEC disclosure rules. We begin with a discussion of the role of boards of directors, public accounting firms, and corporate attorneys in the preparation and review of mandatory disclosures. We then organize current research into three broad types of variation in compliance: completeness, timeliness, and readability. Our review highlights three interesting areas for future research: (1) studies that examine the relations between completeness, timeliness, and readability within the same research design, (2) studies that assess whether boards of directors, public accounting firms, and corporate attorneys view disclosure compliance as a general firm policy, and (3) studies that investigate the influence of corporate attorneys on mandatory disclosure, as well as studies of disclosure issues that require collaboration between auditors and corporate attorneys. As a first step to address the latter agenda, we investigate whether corporate attorneys affect disclosure and present evidence that corporate attorney fixed effects matter for mandatory disclosure compliance.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
Keywords: mandatory disclosure, compliance, disclosure regulation, corporate attorneys, corporate governance
JEL Classification: G14, G18, K22, M40
Date posted: March 25, 2013 ; Last revised: May 16, 2013
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