Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239534
 
 

References (23)



 
 

Footnotes (13)



 


 



Corporate Leniency Programs When Firms Have Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre‐Emption


Joseph E. Harrington Jr


University of Pennsylvania

March 2013

The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 61, Issue 1, pp. 1-27, 2013

Abstract:     
A corporate leniency program provides relief from government penalties to the first member of a cartel to cooperate with the authorities. This study explores the incentives to apply for leniency when each cartel member has private information as to the likelihood that the competition authority will be able to convict them without a cooperating firm. A firm may apply for leniency because it fears being convicted (‘prosecution effect’) or because it fears another firm will apply (‘pre‐emption effect’). Policies by the competition authority to magnify concerns about pre‐emption - and thereby induce greater use of the leniency program - are also explored.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Accepted Paper Series





Date posted: March 26, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Harrington Jr, Joseph E., Corporate Leniency Programs When Firms Have Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre‐Emption (March 2013). The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 61, Issue 1, pp. 1-27, 2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239534 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12014

Contact Information

Joseph E. Harrington Jr (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania ( email )
No Address Available
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 194
Downloads: 1
References:  23
Footnotes:  13

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.485 seconds