Board Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover
Vidhan K. Goyal
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology - Department of Finance
Chul W. Park
The University of Hong Kong - School of Business
July 1, 2001
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2002
We study whether bestowing CEO and chairman duties on one individual affects a board's decision to dismiss an ineffective CEO. The results show that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly lower when the CEO and chairman responsibilities are vested in the same individual. These results are consistent with the view that the lack of independent leadership in firms that combine the CEO and chairman positions makes it difficult for the board to remove poorly performing managers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30
Keywords: Corporate governance; Leadership structure; CEO duties; CEO turnover; sensitivity to firm performance
JEL Classification: G34, D23
Date posted: June 14, 2000 ; Last revised: July 29, 2014
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