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http://ssrn.com/abstract=224146
 
 

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Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned Incentives?


Charles M. Yablon


Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Jennifer G. Hill


University of Sydney - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 35, p. 83, 2000
Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 23

Abstract:     
Timing of stock option grants has become a significant corporate governance issue, in the light of the SEC's on-going inquiry into back-dating of stock options.

In this article, we examine the general problem of misalignment of interests arising from managerial discretion as to the timing and content of corporate disclosures in the context of performance-based compensation. We consider, and assess from a legal perspective, several empirical studies, which strongly suggest that CEOs are manipulating disclosure in such a way as to increase their own compensation. We argue that all but the most egregious forms of disclosure manipulation by management are either legally permissible or effectively insulated from legal redress.

The article then examines the underlying rationales for the existence of broad managerial discretion over timing of disclosure under securities laws, and the extent to which possible misalignment of interests in the area of disclosure timing and performance-based pay can be reduced by governance mechanisms, such as improved board monitoring, structural changes to performance-based pay or enhanced enforcement of securities laws. We conclude that although each governance mechanism has a role to play, no single mechanism is likely to be a governance panacea.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Timing, stock options, options, disclosure, CEO compensation, executive remuneration, performance-based pay, insider trading

JEL Classification: G30, G34, G38, J33, K22, K33, K40, M52, 016

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Date posted: August 1, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Yablon, Charles M. and Hill, Jennifer G., Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned Incentives?. Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 35, p. 83, 2000; Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 23. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=224146 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.224146

Contact Information

Charles M. Yablon
Yeshiva University - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law ( email )
55 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-790-0200 (Phone)
212-790-0205 (Fax)

Jennifer G. Hill (Contact Author)
University of Sydney - Faculty of Law ( email )
Faculty of Law Building, F10
The University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia
+61 2 9351 0280 (Phone)
+61 2 9351 0200 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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