Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242240
 
 

References (31)



 


 



Unilateral Climate Policy: Can OPEC Resolve the Leakage Problem?


Christoph Böhringer


University of Oldenburg - Economic Policy; Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Knut Einar Rosendahl


Norwegian University of Life Sciences; Statistics Norway - Research Department

Jan Schneider


University of Oldenburg

March 30, 2013

USAEE Working Paper No. 13-121

Abstract:     
In the abscence of a global agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, individual countries have introduced national climate policies. Unilateral action involves the risk of relocating emissions to regions without climate regulations, i.e., emission leakage. A major channel for leakage are price changes in the international oil market. Previous studies on leakage have assumed competitive behaviour in this market. Here, we consider alternative assumptions about OPEC’s behaviour in order to assess how these affect leakage and costs of unilateral climate policies. Our results based on simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of the global economy suggest that assumptions on OPEC’s behaviour are crucial to the impact assessment of unilateral climate policy measures. We find that leakage through the oil market may become negative when OPEC is perceived as a dominant producer, thereby reducing overall leakage drastically compared to a setting where the oil market is perceived competitive.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Carbon Leakage, Oil Market, OPEC Behaviour

JEL Classification: C72, Q41, Q54

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 1, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Böhringer, Christoph and Rosendahl, Knut Einar and Schneider, Jan, Unilateral Climate Policy: Can OPEC Resolve the Leakage Problem? (March 30, 2013). USAEE Working Paper No. 13-121. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242240 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2242240

Contact Information

Christoph Bohringer
University of Oldenburg - Economic Policy ( email )
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )
D-68161 Mannheim
Germany
+49 6211235200 (Phone)
+49 6211235226 (Fax)
Knut Einar Rosendahl (Contact Author)
Norwegian University of Life Sciences ( email )
PO Box 5033
NO-1432 Aas
Norway
+47 64966117 (Phone)
Statistics Norway - Research Department ( email )
Kongens Gt. 6
PO Box 8131 Dep
N-0033 Oslo
Norway
+47 21094954 (Phone)
+47 21094963 (Fax)
Jan Schneider
University of Oldenburg ( email )
Oldenburg, D-26111
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 383
Downloads: 58
Download Rank: 217,599
References:  31

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.407 seconds